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We examine the effect of the Amnesty Plus policy on the incentives of firms to engage in cartel 
activities.  Amnesty  Plus  is  aimed  at  attracting  amnesty  applications  by  encouraging  firms, 
convicted  in  one  market,  to  report  their  collusive  agreements  in  other  markets.  It  has  been 
vigorously advertised that Amnesty Plus weakens cartel stability. We show to the contrary that 
Amnesty Plus may not have this desirable effect, and, if improperly designed, may even stabilize 
a cartel. We suggest a simple discount-setting rule to avoid this anticompetitive effect. 
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Experience garnered over many years has taught antitrust authorities in the United States
(US) and the European Union (EU) that companies which have been colluding in one specic
product market are more likely to have engaged in cartel activities in adjacent markets.
Due to the high diversity of businesses in multinational rms, cartel activities bear all
the marks of contagion within companies. The probably most well-known example for such a
cross-linked collusive pattern is the vitamin conspiracy. The striking feature of this complex
of infringements is the central role played by Homann-La Roche (HLR) and BASF, the two
main vitamin producers, over the course of ten years in virtually every cartel aecting the
whole extent of bulk vitamin production.1 HLR, BASF and Rh^ one-Poulenc instigated the rst
group of cartels which consisted of price xing agreements in the markets for vitamins A and
E. The initial success of these arrangements inspired their replication in other vitamin mar-
kets. Accordingly, the European Commission (EC) stated that \the simultaneous existence of
the collusive arrangements in the various vitamins was not a spontaneous or haphazard devel-
opment, but was conceived and directed by the same persons at the most senior levels of the
companies concerned".2 Rh^ one-Poulenc's disclosure of evidence on collusion in the markets
for vitamins A and E led to the opening of an investigation. However, only the comprehensive
collaboration of BASF with the US Department of Justice (DoJ) under the Amnesty Plus
program led to the successful prosecution of all participants. When Rh^ one-Poulenc plead
guilty to price xing in the vitamins A and E, it did however not provide any information on
its participation in the vitamin D3 infringement and even pursued cartel activities in other
product markets such as the markets for methionine and methylglucamine.3
In 1999, the DoJ implemented the Amnesty Plus program as part of its Corporate Leniency
Policy in response to the increasing number of parallel oenders. According to Hammond,
\The Division's Amnesty Plus program creates an attractive inducement for encouraging
companies who are already under investigation to report the full extent of their antitrust
crimes [:::]" (Hammond, 2004, p.16).
Leniency programs cancel the ne against the rst cartel member that brings decisive
evidence to the antitrust authority. Amnesty Plus aims at attracting amnesty applications by
encouraging subjects of ongoing investigations to consider whether they qualify for amnesty in
other than the currently inspected markets. In particular, Amnesty Plus oers a rm, which
plea-bargains an agreement for participation in one cartel, where it cannot obtain amnesty,
complete immunity in a second cartel aecting another market. Provided that the rm agrees
1Concerned were the markets for vitamins A, E, B1, B2, B3 (niacin), B4 (choline chloride), B5, B6, B9
(folic acid), B12, C, D3, H (biotin), beta carotene, carotenoids and premixes.
2EC IP/01/1625 November 2001, p.2.
3EC IP/01/1625 and OJ L 6 of 10.1.2003, p.1-89; EC IP/02/976 and OJ L 255, 08.10.2003, p.1-32; EC
IP/02/1746 and OJ L 38, 10.2.2004, p.18-46.
1to fully cooperate in the investigation of the conspiracy of which the DoJ was previously not
aware, it is automatically granted amnesty for this second oense. Moreover, the company
benets from a \substantial additional discount" (Hammond, 2006, p.10), i.e. the Plus, in the
calculation of its ne in any plea agreement for the initial matter under investigation.
Under the current EC Leniency Notice, Amnesty Plus does not exist. Although the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended the inclusion
of Amnesty Plus as part of the 2002 reforms of the EU Leniency Program, the EC did not
seize the opportunity to follow the US example by adopting a similar policy. Also in 2006,
the EC failed to incorporate Amnesty Plus in the reform package.
The present paper studies how the Amnesty Plus policy aects rms' incentives to form
a cartel.4 Following a conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus may encourage rms to report
another cartel by granting the rst rm which applies for this program a discount on the
ne already imposed. Ex ante, however, the opportunity to benet from Amnesty Plus may
decrease the expected ne in one market and make the formation of a cartel - not in this -
but in another market, more attractive.
We study two markets in which two identical rms play an innitely repeated game of
collusion. In each period, the rms can choose to form a cartel before interacting in the
product market. Collusion generates incriminating evidence which the antitrust authority
can discover with some probability. Each rm can also bring this evidence to the authority.
When a cartel is detected, each cartel member, except the rst reporting rm, pays a ne.
Amnesty Plus sets in when the rms decide whether to report the second cartel after having
been convicted in the rst market.
Our main result is that Amnesty Plus can increase the extent of collusion if the discount
on the ne imposed for the initial infringement exceeds the ne the Amnesty Plus applicant
would have incurred in the second market. To avoid this adverse eect, the design of the
Amnesty Plus policy must respect a discount-setting rule that xes the discount in the rst
market equal or below the ne in the second market. A leniency policy with an Amnesty Plus
program that sticks to this rule always performs weakly better, in terms of cartel deterrence,
than a standard leniency policy without Amnesty Plus. The reason is that Amnesty Plus may
induce the reporting of the second cartel after a rst detection. Increased desistance from
cartel activities in the reporting stage reduces the value of joint collusion provided that the
ne discount does not increase the expected collusive value at this stage.
Recent theoretical contributions such as Harrington (2008), Chen and Rey (2007), Aubert
et al. (2006), Spagnolo (2004) and Motta and Polo (2003) study the trade-o leniency gen-
erates between less cartel stability through encouraged reporting and more cartel stability
through lower expected nes. The overall conclusion is that leniency programs, if properly
4In a previous study, Roux and Von Ungern-Sternberg (2007) examine how Amnesty Plus aects the
companies' incentives to reveal their collusive conduct when they are engaged in two cartels simultaneously.
The authors use a static model and focus on the eect of Amnesty Plus on cartel stability ex post.
2designed, make collusion more dicult.5 Several studies suggest that positive rewards may
further strengthen the deterrence power of leniency programs (Aubert et al., 2006; Spagnolo,
2004).
Amnesty Plus is equivalent to a leniency program, coupled with a positive reward for the
rst informant, that is available in one market - say market 2 - only if the cartel in market 1
is discovered. Amnesty Plus, unlike a standard leniency program, therefore strategically links
two markets. The reward can stabilize cartel 2 if cartel 1 is formed and thereby increase the
extent of collusion. This market linkage also has an important implication for the procom-
petitive potential of Amnesty Plus. Contrary to a standard leniency program, Amnesty Plus
may destabilize a cartel even if the probability of detection in that market is zero. Detection
must just be likely enough in the other market. Amnesty Plus may thus be particularly useful
when probabilities of detection dier across markets.
Another strand of literature closely linked to our analysis studies the role of multimarket
contact between rms in sustaining collusion when there is no antitrust enforcement. In
their seminal paper, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) give theoretical support to the informal
argument, rst raised by Edwards (1955), that multimarket contact may enhance collusion.
They show that the rms can pool the incentive constraints of the dierent markets where
they operate in order to transfer slack from a more to a less collusive market. At worst,
with identical rms and markets, multimarket contact does not aect the opportunities for
cooperation. At best, it facilitates collusion.6
In a recent paper, Choi and Gerlach (2009b) examine the sustainability of collusion in two
markets linked by demand relationships. They nd that successful prosecution in one market
may destabilize collusion in the adjacent market if products are substitutes, whereas in the
case of complements, successful prosecution in one market may increase cartel stability in
the adjacent market. Choi and Gerlach (2009a) focus on substitutes and show that, if there
is one local authority per market, free-rider problems, that arise due to positive prosecution
externalities in each market, can only be solved by coordinating enforcement eorts across
jurisdictions. Although both studies combine multimarket contact with antitrust enforcement,
they do not analyze the strategic eects generated by Amnesty Plus or even leniency programs
in this context.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Sections
3 and 4 analyze cartel formation. Section 5 extends our analysis to the case of heterogenous
detection probabilities, partial collusion and more than 2 rms and 2 markets. Section 6
concludes.
5See also Miller (2009), Goeree and Helland (2009) and Brenner (2005) for empirical studies and Bigoni
et al. (2009), Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Apesteguia et al. (2007) for experiments.




We consider two markets, 1 and 2, in which two identical rms play an innitely repeated
game where, in each period, they can choose to form a cartel before interacting in the product
market. Communication is necessary for collusion and generates hard evidence which makes
it possible to establish the antitrust oense.7 Markets 1 and 2 dier in protability. In
particular, market 1 is more protable than market 2. Firms discount future payos by a
common discount factor  2 [0;1[. We compare the rms' decisions to form cartels under the
EU and the US antitrust legislations whose sole dierence here is that the latter comprises
an Amnesty Plus program.
Throughout the analysis we use the following notation: We refer to variables of a specic
market by using the indices 1 and 2. When considering any of the two markets, we use the
index k, and we refer to the other market by using the index  k.
In each period, the fully collusive joint prot in market k is 2k > 0, and thus, each rm
makes a cartel prot equal to k.8 If the rms compete, they make zero prots. In case one
rm unilaterally deviates from the collusive agreement while the other continues to collude,
the deviating rm earns the whole short-term cartel prot 2k alone, whereas the other rm
gets nothing. The rms use (grim) trigger strategies. The punishment they agreed upon
starts the period following the deviation and lasts forever after.
At the time the rms decide whether to enter a collusive agreement, they observe the
exogenous per-period conviction probability q > 0 with which the Antitrust Authority (AA)
detects a cartel and convicts the colluding rms. Detection is independent across markets
and over time.9 Each convicted rm pays a strictly positive, market specic ne Fk which
is reduced under Amnesty Plus to Fk   Rk in return for the disclosure of the second cartel.
Rk 2 ]0;Fk] represents the ne reduction granted to the rst informant. The higher Rk the
more generous the Amnesty Plus policy. The successful applicant receives amnesty in the
second infringement because it is the rst company reporting in that market. If both rms
simultaneously apply for Amnesty Plus, each is rst with probability 1
2.
The nes are such that F1  F2.10 We assume that the ne-prot ratio is higher for
7For collusion to be illegal, there must be evidence of an explicit agreement between the rms (McCutcheon,
1997). The view that collusion is self-enforcing but requires communication is common in the literature on
leniency programs. See Aubert et al. (2006).
8We focus on full collusion in the main analysis and allow for partial collusion in extension 5.4.
9Detection in one market may increase as well as decrease the probability of detection in the other market.
Rollover investigations make a second conviction more likely whereas limited resources of the AA and increased
eorts by the rms to conceal the remaining conspiracy make it less likely. Assuming independence across
markets is equivalent to saying that both eects are equally strong. By the independence over time assumption
we impose stationarity.
10We believe that, in the light of 1 > 2, the assumption F1  F2 is plausible. In practice, nes are set
according to judicial principles which link them to the gravity of the infringement, and thus, to the nature and
4market 2 than for market 1, i.e. F2
2 > F1
1. This reects the idea that the ne rises less than
proportionally with the cartel prot. Legislative provisions and ne records support this
assumption.11 Heterogenous ne-prot ratios create heterogenous cartel formation incentives
across markets and thereby generate a parameter range where, in the absence of Amnesty
Plus, the rms form only one of the cartels. It is in this range where Amnesty Plus can
produce a negative eect by inducing the formation of the second cartel.12
We assume that the evidence of collusion lasts for one period. Thus, after a rm has
deviated from a collusive agreement it is held liable for its cartel behavior and can be ned
until the end of the period in which the deviation occurred.13 Each cartel member has
the possibility to bring the incriminating evidence to the AA. The rst informant receives
immunity from nes under a standard leniency program. Again, if both rms simultaneously
apply for leniency, each is rst with probability 1
2.
Following a cartel conviction, we assume that the AA closely monitors the previously
collusive industry and thus, rms compete, and they never return back to collusion in the
same market.
2.2 Timing
The timing of the game is a version of the time structure used in Chen and Rey (2007),
adapted to multimarket contact. In each period, the structure is as follows:
Stage 0: Each rm decides whether to enter a collusive agreement in the market(s) where
no cartel has been previously convicted. If at least one rm decides not to collude in
market k, competition takes place in this market. If this happens in both markets, the
rms compete, and the game ends for that period. If both rms choose to collude in
market k, their communication leaves some hard evidence.
importance of the anticompetitive behavior. The latter relates, at least indirectly, to the collusive overcharge
which is, with zero competitive prots, equivalent to cartel prots.
11The ne-prot ratio decreases with market size if small nes are inated compared to high nes. The EU
ne setting guidelines suggest that this is the case: First, the basic amount of the ne can be increased to
ensure a sucient deterrent eect of the ne. As a ne of a big absolute size is more likely to act as a deterrent
(e.g. because of high media coverage), the deterrent uplift for a small ne seems to be relatively bigger than
for a high ne. Second, the legal maximum, i.e. 10% of the rm's total turnover in the preceding business year,
imposes a cap on large nes. Hence, the nes for large cartels are more likely to be capped than the nes for
smaller cartels. Third, the \multiplier" increases the nal amount of the ne if the Commissioner judges that
the turnover of the convicted market is too small, and thus, the ne too low, relative to the company's entire
turnover. The ne is multiplied by a number, historically between 2 and 5, to increase the nancial impact of
the penalty. There is also empirical evidence supporting our hypothesis. In particular, see Combe and Monnier
(2009) and Connor (2005).
12Instead of heterogenous ne-prot ratios, we could use anything else that creates an asymmetry between
the incentive compatibility constraints.
13The limitation period of the liability for antitrust oenses is generally a positive number of years. Article 25
of the EC Council Regulation 1/2003 states that the Commission can sue for Administrative Action until ve
years from the date of the infringement. Moreover, \[:::] in the case of continuing or repeated infringements,
time shall begin to run on the day on which the infringement ceases".
5Stage 1: Each rm decides whether to stick to, or to deviate from, the collusive agree-
ment(s). Its rival does not observe this decision until the end of stage 2.
Stage 2: Each rm decides whether to report the evidence it holds in each cartel to
the AA. A cartel is convicted (with certainty) if at least one rm self-reports. The rst
informant gets complete immunity from nes in this market, whereas the other rm has
to pay the full ne. If each cartel formed in stage 0 is reported in this stage, the game
ends for this period; otherwise:
Stage 3: Each cartel formed in stage 0 and not reported in stage 2 is detected with
probability q. If the AA does not detect any cartel, the game ends for that period. If
the AA however detects the cartel(s) formed in stage 0 and not reported in stage 2, the
colluding rms pay the corresponding nes, and the game ends for that period. If the
rms have formed both cartels in stage 0 and not reported them in stage 2, and the AA
has detected only one of them, then:
Stage 4: Each rm chooses whether to report the remaining cartel.
If Amnesty Plus exists, it is relevant only if the game reaches stage 4. This stage forms the
reporting subgame where, after the detection of cartel k, the rms decide whether to report
the remaining cartel  k. Amnesty Plus can alter the equilibria of this subgame and thereby
aect the equilibria of the entire game.
Under each leniency policy, we dene a set of strategies corresponding to three regimes:
collusion in one market only, sequential collusion and joint collusion. We then determine the
best collusive (subgame-perfect) symmetric equilibrium of the game without Amnesty Plus,
constituted by these strategies, and compare it to its counterpart in the game with Amnesty
Plus.
3 Collusion Under the EU Leniency Program
A strategy is denoted s over a single period and S over all periods. In particular, we denote
s0 (S0) the strategy that consists of competing over one period (all periods).
3.1 Collusion in One Market
To analyze collusion in only one market, we consider the following strategies:
sk: collude in market k only, neither deviate from the collusive agreement nor report.
Sk: play sk in t = 0 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation from the
collusive agreement nor reporting nor detection; otherwise play s0 for the remaining periods.
6The cartel in market k is individually stable, i.e. the strategy pair (Sk;Sk) is an equilibrium,
if and only if the gain from any unilateral deviation does not exceed the present discounted
expected payo Vk() when both rms play Sk. This payo is recursively dened as
Vk() = q(k   Fk) + (1   q)(k + Vk())
which we rewrite as
Vk() =
k   qFk
1   (1   q)
In the presence of a leniency policy where the rst informant pays no ne, the optimal uni-
lateral deviation is to deviate from and to immediately report the collusive agreement. This
deviation yields a payo equal to 2k. Both deviating without reporting and reporting with-
out deviating yield lower payos, namely 2k  qFk and 0. Thus, (Sk;Sk) is an equilibrium if
and only if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
Vk()  2k
We rewrite this constraint as





The individual stability threshold e k is increasing in q and
Fk
k. Intuitively, the higher the
probability of conviction and the higher the ne-prot ratio, the more rms have to value
future ows of collusive prots, and thus, the higher the discount factor needed to individually
sustain the cartel. Our assumption F2
2 > F1
1 implies that e 2 > e 1, i.e. the cartel in market 2
is harder to sustain than the cartel in the more protable market 1. Finally, we assume that
q < 2
22+F2. Otherwise, cartel 2 would be individually unstable for any value  2 [0;1[.14
3.2 Sequential Collusion
Sequential collusion refers to a situation in which the rms collude in only one market as long
as they go undetected. After a detection in this market, they switch to collusion in the other
market. We consider the following strategy:
Sk! k: play sk in t = 0 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation
from the collusive agreement nor reporting nor detection; if there is detection but no deviation
from the collusive agreement in t, play s k in t + 1 and in any subsequent period as long as
14The probability of detection seems to be quite low also in reality. Bryant and Eckard (1991) estimate the
maximum probability of getting caught by the US authorities in any given year at 13% to 17%. Combe et al.
(2008) nd around 13% for a European sample.
7there is neither deviation from the collusive agreement nor reporting nor detection; in all
other cases, play s0 for the remaining periods.
We focus on the sequential strategy S1!2.15 The cartels are sequentially stable, i.e. the
strategy pair (S1!2;S1!2) is an equilibrium, if and only if no rm has an incentive to deviate
both when collusion occurs in market 1 and when it occurs in market 2. Each rm's present
discounted expected payo V1!2() when both rms play S1!2 is recursively dened as
V1!2() = q (1   F1 + V2()) + (1   q)(1 + V1!2())
which can be rewritten as
V1!2() = V1() + q

1   (1   q)
V2()




It is straightforward that the latter constraint implies the former. Thus, (S1!2;S1!2) is an
equilibrium if and only if cartel 2 is individually stable, i.e.   e 2:
3.3 Joint Collusion
To study simultaneous collusion in both markets, we consider the following strategies:
s12: collude in both markets, neither deviate from any of the collusive agreements nor report.
S12: play s12 in t = 0 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation
from any collusive agreement nor reporting nor detection; if there is detection of cartel k but
neither deviation from any collusive agreement nor reporting in t, play s k in t + 1, and in
any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation from the collusive agreement in
market  k nor reporting nor detection, if cartel  k is individually stable; in all other cases,
play s0 for the remaining periods.
The two cartels are jointly stable under the EU policy, i.e. the strategy pair (S12;S12) is an
equilibrium, if and only if the gain from any unilateral deviation does not exceed the present
discounted expected value V12() when both rms play S12. We denote V12() the `value of
15In appendix A we show that there exists e q > 0 such that (S2!1;S2!1) can never be the best collusive
equilibrium if q < e q. Throughout the paper we assume that the latter condition holds. This assumption has no
qualitative implications for the analysis of the eect of Amnesty Plus but eases the exposition by eliminating
(S2!1;S2!1) as a possible candidate for the best collusive equilibrium.
8joint collusion' for the EU. The strategy S12 involves multimarket punishment. If one rm
unilaterally deviates from the collusive agreement in one of the markets, the co-conspirator
reverts to competition in both markets. The optimal unilateral deviation is then to deviate
from the collusive agreements in both markets simultaneously and report both cartels. This
deviation ensures a payo equal to 21 + 22. Thus, (S12;S12) is an equilibrium if and only
if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
V12()  21 + 22
The value of joint collusion depends on whether the cartels are individually stable. There are
three cases:
a-If cartel 1 is individually stable while cartel 2 is not, i.e. e 1   < e 2, the value of joint
collusion is recursively dened as
V12() = q2(1 + 2   F1   F2) + q(1   q)(1 + 2   F1)
+ q(1   q)(1 + 2   F2 + V1()) + (1   q)2 (1 + 2 + V12())
From the independence assumption on the AA's detection technology it follows that the
probability of detecting both cartels during a specic period is q2, only cartel 1 (cartel 2) is
q(1   q), and none of the cartels (1   q)2. If the AA detects cartel 1, the rms stop forming
the individually unstable cartel 2. We rewrite the value of joint collusion as
V12() =
1   qF1
1   (1   q)
+
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2 (1)
b-If both cartels are individually unstable, i.e.  < e 1, the value of joint collusion is
V12() =
1   qF1
1   (1   q)2 +
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2 (2)
c-If both cartels are individually stable, i.e. e 2   < 1, the value of joint collusion is
V12() =
1   qF1
1   (1   q)
+
2   qF2
1   (1   q)
(3)
3.4 Best Collusive Equilibrium
Proposition 1 characterizes the Pareto dominant equilibrium under the EU antitrust policy.
Proposition 1 There exists a joint stability threshold e 12 2 ]e 1;e 2] such that:
-If  < e 1, the competitive equilibrium (S0;S0) is the only equilibrium.
-If e 1   < e 12, the individual collusion equilibrium (S1;S1) is the best collusive equilibrium.
-If e 12   < 1, the joint collusion equilibrium (S12;S12) is the best collusive equilibrium.
9Proof. See appendix C.
Over the interval [e 12;1[, the expected lifespan of cartel 2 depends on the size of . For
 2 [e 12;e 2[, cartel 2 is sustained only as long as the AA does not detect any of the cartels,
whereas for  2 [e 2;1[, cartel 2 is sustained up to its own detection.
By linking the punishment across markets, the rms can potentially transfer slack enforce-
ment power from market 1 to market 2 and sustain collusion in both markets for values of
 < e 2, i.e. even when cartel 2 is individually unstable. Multimarket contact has this pro-
collusive eect if and only if e 12 < e 2. In appendix B, we provide a necessary and sucient
condition for the latter inequality to hold and discuss how the possibility of cartel detection
aects the procollusive potential of multimarket contact.
4 Collusion Under the US Leniency Program
We now introduce Amnesty Plus and examine its eect, rst, on the equilibrium of the
reporting subgame in stage 4 and, second, on the best collusive equilibrium of the entire
game.
4.1 Reporting Subgame
In the absence of Amnesty Plus, the subgame exhibits two possible equilibria if cartel k
is detected in the previous stage: Both rms reporting and both rms not reporting the
remaining cartel. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is to not report the remaining cartel
 k because each rm's expected payo is  1
2F k if both rms report compared to zero
(when cartel  k is individually unstable) and the continuation value V k (when cartel  k
is individually stable) if none reports. As the rms do not report in the Pareto dominant
equilibrium, they only desist from cartel  k if it is individually unstable. Figures 1 and 2
show the payo matrices of this subgame.





Figure 1: Cartel k unstable





Figure 2: Cartel k stable
Amnesty Plus may alter the rms' reporting decisions by creating a prisoners' dilemma
where reporting cartel  k forms an equilibrium in dominant strategies. If a rm anticipates
that its partner reports, it always prefers reporting. If a rm anticipates that its co-conspirator
does not report, it prefers to report for any ne reduction Rk if cartel  k is individually
unstable (Figure 3) because it gets a strictly positive Rk from reporting versus zero from
not reporting. If cartel  k is individually stable, a rm, which anticipates that its partner
does not report, nds it (strictly) optimal to report if and only if Rk > V k() (Figure 4).
10Not reporting would imply the renewed formation of the cartel in the next period and is
therefore dominated by reporting only if the ne reduction exceeds the present discounted
expected payo a rm gets from this cartel. It is in these two cases where the problem of
Amnesty Plus becomes apparent: While Amnesty Plus induces the rms to make the desired
reporting decision, it may increase each rm's equilibrium payo X = 1
2(Rk  F k) above the
equilibrium payo in the subgame under the EU policy. Amnesty Plus may therefore raise
the value of collusion over the entire game.
F1, F2 R NR
R X,X R k, Fk
NR  Fk,R k 0,0
Figure 3: Cartel k unstable
F1, F2 R NR
R X,X R k, Fk
NR  Fk,R k Vk,Vk
Figure 4: Cartel k stable
Amnesty Plus does not aect the rms' decisions to not report an individually stable
cartel if Rk  V k(). The subgame exhibits again two possible equilibria, but not reporting
Pareto dominates reporting because 1
2(Rk F k) < Rk  V k(). Notice that we can rewrite
Rk  V k() as
  b  k(Rk) 
Rk
 k   qF k + (1   q)Rk
where b  k(Rk) denes a robustness threshold for an individually stable cartel  k such that,
above this threshold, it is robust to, and thus, survives the detection of cartel k.
4.2 Joint Collusion
Amnesty Plus cannot alter strategy proles that do not involve simultaneous collusive inter-
action in the two markets. Hence, the strategies s0, sk, S0, Sk and S1!2 are identical with
and without Amnesty Plus. The strategy prole for joint collusion is now given by:
sAP
12 : collude in both markets, neither deviate from any of the collusive agreements nor report;
if there is detection of one cartel, do not report the remaining cartel under Amnesty Plus if
it is individually stable and robust, otherwise report.
SAP
12 : play sAP
12 in t = 0 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation
from any of the collusive agreements nor reporting nor detection; if there is detection of cartel
k but neither deviation from any collusive agreement nor reporting in t, play s k in t+1, and
in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation from the collusive agreement in
market  k nor reporting nor detection, if cartel  k is individually stable and robust; in all
other cases, play s0 for the remaining periods.
The two cartels are jointly stable under the US policy, i.e. the strategy pair (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 )
is an equilibrium, if and only if the gain from any unilateral deviation does not exceed the
present discounted expected value V AP
12 (;R1;R2) when both rms play SAP
12 . We denote
11V12() the `value of joint collusion' for the US. Here again, the optimal unilateral deviation is
to deviate from the collusive agreements in both markets and to report both cartels. Thus,
(SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ) is an equilibrium if and only if the following incentive compatibility constraint
holds:
V AP
12 (;R1;R2)  21 + 22
The value of joint collusion depends on the outcome of the reporting subgame in stage 4.
There are four dierent cases:
a-If cartel 1 is stable and robust while cartel 2 is either unstable or stable but not robust,
i.e. max(~ 1; ^ 1(R2))   < max(~ 2; ^ 2(R1)), both rms report cartel 2 but not cartel 1 in the
reporting subgame. The value of joint collusion is thus recursively dened as
V AP
12 (;R1;R2) = q2(1 + 2   F1   F2) + q(1   q)






+ q(1   q)(1 + 2   F2 + V1) + (1   q)2  
1 + 2 + V AP
12 (;R1;R2)





1   (1   q)
+
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2 +
q(1   q)(R1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)
(4)
b-If cartel 2 is stable and robust and cartel 1 is stable but not robust, i.e. max(~ 2; ^ 2(R1)) 




1   (1   q)2 +
2   qF2
1   (1   q)
+
q(1   q)(R2   F1)
2(1   (1   q)2)
(5)
c-If both cartels are either individually unstable or individually stable but not robust, i.e.





1   (1   q)2 +
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2 +
q(1   q)(R1 + R2   F1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)
(6)
d-If both cartels are individually stable and robust, i.e.   (~ k; ^ k(R k)) for both k = 1;2,




1   (1   q)
+
2   qF2
1   (1   q)
(7)
124.3 Best Collusive Equilibrium
Amnesty Plus may enhance desistance through reporting and is therefore benecial for com-
petition after a rst cartel conviction. It may however generate potentially conicting eects
at the stage of cartel formation: First, the desistance eect which occurs if Amnesty Plus
induces the rms to report, and thus terminate, an individually stable collusive agreement
after a rst detection. This eect is either negative, i.e. it reduces the value of joint collusion,
or zero. Second, the reporting eect which captures the expected equilibrium benets from
reporting under Amnesty Plus. This eect is either negative or zero or positive. We explore
the net eect of Amnesty Plus in the subsequent analysis.
4.3.1 Neutrality of Amnesty Plus on Global Competition
Consider the interval [0;e 1[. Amnesty Plus is neutral, and the only equilibrium is (S0;S0).
To see this, note that if Amnesty Plus were to have an eect, it would have to make either
individual or joint collusion sustainable, i.e. make either (S1;S1) or (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ) an equilibrium.
The former is clearly impossible because Amnesty Plus is irrelevant when rms collude in one
market only. The latter cannot occur as well because, from the expressions in (2) and (6), we
see that Amnesty Plus weakly decreases the value of jointly colluding over this interval:
V AP
12 (;R1;R2) = V12() +
q(1   q)(R1 + R2   F1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)
 V12()
for all  2 [0;e 1[.
4.3.2 The Anticompetitive Eect of Amnesty Plus
Consider the interval [e 1;e 12[ where (S1;S1) is the best collusive equilibrium in the EU.
Amnesty Plus is anticompetitive if it induces the formation of cartel 2, i.e. it makes (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 )
the best collusive equilibrium, for discount factor values in this interval. This can happen
only if Amnesty Plus increases the value of joint collusion.
Lemma 1 Amnesty Plus increases the value of joint collusion for  in the interval [e 1;e 12[
if and only if cartel 1 is robust and the ne discount granted in market 1 in return for the
disclosure of cartel 2 exceeds the ne that would have otherwise been imposed for the reported
cartel 2:
V AP
12 (;R1;R2) > V12() ()   b 1(R2) and R1 > F2
Proof. See appendix C.
The net eect of Amnesty Plus is equal to V AP
12 (;R1;R2)   V12(). If this dierence is
positive, Amnesty Plus is potentially anticompetitive. If cartel 1 is robust, the value of joint
13collusion is given by equation (4) for the US and by equation (1) for the EU. We can separate




1   (1   q)
+
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2  
1   qF1
1   (1   q)
 
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2 = 0 (8)
R =
q(1   q)(R1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)
<>= 0
The desistance eect is zero because Amnesty Plus does not induce the reporting of the
individually stable cartel 1 in this case. However, if R1 > F2, the reporting eect is strictly
positive and Amnesty Plus increases the value of joint collusion.
Proposition 2 (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ) is the best collusive equilibrium for a non-empty range of values
of  in the interval [e 1;e 12[ if and only if
R2 <  R2 
e 12(1   qF1)
1   e 12(1   q)
(9)
R1 > R
 1  F2 +
2









Proof. See appendix C.
Proposition 2 is central to our paper. It suggests that situations occur in which Amnesty
Plus stabilizes the previously unstable cartel 2 and thereby increases the extent of collusion.
If the ne in market 2 is small such that F2 <  R2, condition (9) always holds because of
our assumption that Rk  Fk.16 Amnesty Plus is then anticompetitive if the AA over-
rewards applicants by granting a reduction R1 in return for the reporting of cartel 2 that is
too high. Condition (10) boils down to R1 > F2 if multimarket contact is procollusive, i.e.
e 12 < e 2.17 An agency that acts optimally would not agree to such a large discount. However,
an agency that maximizes the number of convicted cartels rather than minimizing the number
of cartels formed denitely has incentives to over-reward. As the number of cartels deterred
is unobservable, an antitrust authority can only be assessed based on observable measures
of performance such as the number of successfully prosecuted cartels. Maximal deterrence,
though socially desirable, may therefore not be the primary objective of an antitrust authority
(Harrington, 2010).
16If we suppose that there exists an increasing and continuous function g(.), verifying g(0)=0, such that
Fk  g(k), condition (9) always holds for a suciently small market 2.
17If e 12 < e 2 then V12(e 
 
12) = 21 + 22 while, if e 12 = e 2, this may not be true because it may happen that
V12(e 
 
12) < 21 + 22  V12(e 12).
14Corollary 1 Amnesty Plus has no anticompetitive eect on cartel formation if the ne dis-
count granted in market k in return for the disclosure of cartel  k does not exceed the ne
that would have otherwise been imposed for the reported cartel  k, i.e. Rk  F k.
Proof. The second term of the right hand side in condition (10) of Proposition 2 is weakly
positive. A ne reduction Rk  F k violates this condition.
Corollary 1 suggests that the AA can avoid a procollusive eect of Amnesty Plus by xing
ne discounts such that Rk  F k. This result is crucial because it gives us a clear-cut
policy rule which relies only on parameters set by the authority itself and is therefore easy to
implement.
4.3.3 The Procompetitive Eect of Amnesty Plus
Consider now the interval [e 12;1[ where (S12;S12) is the best collusive equilibrium in the EU.
Amnesty Plus is procompetitive if it either prevents or defers the formation of cartel 2, i.e. if
it makes either (S1;S1) or (S1!2;S1!2) the best collusive equilibrium. We divide this interval
into two sub-intervals. We rst examine [e 12;e 2[ where only cartel 1 is individually stable and
Amnesty Plus can completely deter the formation of cartel 2, and second, we look at [e 2;1[
where both cartels are individually stable and Amnesty Plus can only defer the formation of
cartel 2. We focus on a situation where multimarket contact is procollusive such that e 12 < e 2.
Amnesty Plus prevents the formation of cartel 2, i.e. it makes (S1;S1) the best collusive
equilibrium, for at least some values of  in the interval [e 12;e 2[ if and only if it lowers the
value of joint collusion such that forming both cartels is no longer incentive compatible. Note
that Amnesty Plus neutralizes the procollusive eect of multimarket contact in this case.
Proposition 3 Amnesty Plus prevents the formation of cartel 2 for a non-empty range of
values of  in the interval [e 12;e 2[ if and only if R2 >  R2 or R1 < F2:
- If R2 >  R2, (S1;S1) is the best collusive equilibrium for a non-empty range of values of  in
the interval [e 12;e 2[ for any R1 > 0.
- If R2   R2, (S1;S1) is the best collusive equilibrium for a non-empty range of values of  in
the interval [e 12;e 2[ if and only if R1 < F2.
Proof. See appendix C.
Proposition 3 suggests that, for a high enough ne discount R2, Amnesty Plus causes
desistance and thereby lowers the value of joint collusion such that forming both cartels is
no longer incentive compatible for some values of . If, however, R2 is too low to induce
desistance, the reporting eect in market 2 must be strictly negative to break joint collusion.
In the rst case, cartel 1 is not robust for values of  close enough to e 12. The value of joint
collusion is given in (6) for the US and in (1) for the EU. Separating the dierence of these
15expressions into the desistance and reporting eects, we get
D =
1   qF1
1   (1   q)2  
1   qF1
1   (1   q)
< 0 (11)
R =
q(1   q)(R1 + R2   F1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)
 0
Amnesty Plus induces reporting in stage 4. Each rm's expected reporting benets are (R1+
R2 F1 F2)=2 which must be weakly negative because Rk  Fk. Desistance from the stable
cartel 1 after the detection of cartel 2 strictly lowers the value of joint collusion. Amnesty
Plus therefore prevents the formation of cartel 2 for any ne discount R1 if  is close enough
to e 12. In the second case, cartel 1 is robust for all  in this interval. The desistance and
reporting eects are given by the expressions in (8). Amnesty Plus can induce the reporting
of only the unstable cartel 2 and therefore has no eect on desistance. However, if R1 < F2,
Amnesty Plus lowers the value of joint collusion and may prevent the formation of cartel 2.
Amnesty Plus defers the formation of cartel 2, i.e. it makes (S1!2;S1!2) the best collusive
equilibrium, for at least some values of  in the interval [e 2;1[ if and only if it lowers the value
of jointly colluding such that either joint collusion is no more incentive compatible or is
Pareto dominated by sequential collusion. We give here the intuitive arguments and provide
the detailed formal analysis in appendix D.
Let us rst sketch under what conditions joint collusion is no more incentive compatible.
Loosely speaking, (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ) is not an equilibrium for a non-empty range of values of  in
the interval [e 2;1[ if R1 and R2 take intermediate values. On the one hand, at least one of
the ne reductions must be high enough such that both rms report the remaining stable
cartel in the reporting subgame of stage 4. On the other hand, the same ne reduction that
induces the reporting must be suciently low such that the decrease in the expected ne does
not compensate the rms for the enhanced desistance. If (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ) is not an equilibrium,
(S1!2;S1!2) is the best collusive equilibrium in this interval.
Let us now intuitively explain why the sequential equilibrium may Pareto dominate the
joint equilibrium if the rms' discount factor is suciently close to 1. Amnesty Plus, if it
induces both rms to report, erases future collusive prots in the remaining market. This
is however not the case when rms collude sequentially. If the rms highly value current
collusive prots and care less about the future, i.e. their  is relatively low, they prefer to
collude in both markets today and to incur the risk of being forced to globally compete in
the future. If, however, the rms highly value future prots, they may be willing to sacrice
cartel prots today in return for a longer expected duration of collusion. (S1!2;S1!2) is then
the best collusive equilibrium in this interval.
165 Extensions
5.1 Heterogenous Detection Probabilities
Amnesty Plus strategically links two markets. The direct consequence of this linkage is that
Amnesty Plus may deploy its eects for parameter values where a standard leniency program
cannot inuence collusion at all. To see this, suppose that q1 > 0 and q2 = 0. Possible reasons
for this dierence may be that the AA concentrates on the discovery of big cartels or that
consumers are more sensible to prices of a product with an important sales' volume and thus
are more likely to complain to the authority about the prices in market 1. With q2 = 0 a
standard leniency program has no eect in market 2. This is however not true for Amnesty
Plus. Amnesty Plus induces the reporting of the stable cartel 2 after the detection of cartel
1 if the size of the discount granted in market 1 is greater than the continuation value from
colluding in market 2, which may happen even for q2 = 0. Hence, provided that detection in
market 1 occurs with a suciently high probability, Amnesty Plus may deter the formation
of cartel 2 even for q2 = 0.
5.2 More than two Firms
Consider n  2 rms active on markets 1 and 2. Assume that if all the rms report the
remaining cartel simultaneously in stage 4, each rm is rst with probability 1
n. As only the
rst informant is eligible for the ne discount under Amnesty Plus, a rm's expected payo
from reporting cartel  k, when everyone else does, is 1
nRk   n 1
n F k. We have 1
n[Rk   (n  
1)F k]  0 if and only if Rk  (n 1)F k. Hence, to avoid a potential anticompetitive eect
of Amnesty Plus, the AA would have to set the ne reductions such that Rk  (n 1)F k.18
This constraint becomes slacker as the number of rms increases. Collusion however tends to
be more important in highly concentrated markets, due to eased coordination and monitoring,
than in markets where many small rms operate (Tirole, 1988). Moreover, if the AA wants to
include a discount-setting rule in its amnesty plus policy that depends only on variables set,
or directly observable, by itself then it should set up this rule to avoid the anticompetitive
eect for any possible number of colluding rms. As the worst case scenario occurs for n = 2,
the authority should adopt the rule Rk  F k.
18Consider the case of collusive agreements which do not involve the same set of rms in both markets.
Denote nk the number of rms in cartel k and s the number of rms that participate in both cartels. If s = 0,
Amnesty Plus has no eect. If s  1, Amnesty Plus can increase the value of collusion for the rms involved
in both cartels. But whenever this happens, Amnesty Plus also decreases the expected cartel prots for the
rms colluding in one market only. To avoid an increase in the expected prots for any rm, it must hold that
Rk  (s 1)F k, which can be satised for strictly positive discounts only if s > 1. However, if we consider the
weaker (and more relevant) requirement that Amnesty Plus should not increase the total value of each cartel
then the discount-setting rule Rk  (n k   1)F k is sucient.
175.3 More than two Markets
Consider a set M of markets in which two identical rms interact. Denote jMj = m  2 the
number of markets. For a subset of markets K  M denote K the total prot each rm
earns from collusion and FK the total ne each rm pays if the AA detects the cartels in the
subset K.19 For a subset of markets L  M nK let RL
K be the ne discount the rst rm gets
under Amnesty Plus in return for reporting the cartels in subset L. Assume that RL
K  RL0
K
if L  L0.
Let us rst dene the strategies we consider under a leniency policy without Amnesty Plus.
For any subset of markets I  M denote sI the following strategy over one period: collude
in the subset I, neither deviate from the collusive agreements nor report. In particular, s?
consists of competing in all markets. We recursively dene the strategies SI;t over the subgame
starting from period t and denote VI() as each rm's expected payo discounted to period t
when both rms play SI;t.20
S?;t: play s? in period t and all subsequent periods.
If jIj = 1 then SI;t is the following strategy: play sI in period t and any subsequent period as
long as there is neither deviation from the collusive agreement nor reporting nor detection; if
either deviation or reporting or detection occurs in period t0  t, play S?;t0+1.
If jIj  2 then SI;t is the following strategy: play sI in period t and any subsequent period as
long as there is neither deviation from the collusive agreements nor reporting nor detection;
if detection of a subset of markets J ( I occurs in some period t0  t but neither deviation
from any collusive agreement nor reporting, play SL(I;J);t0+1 where L(I;J)  I r J is such
that VL(I;J)()  VL() for any L  I r J if the set R(I;J) = fL  I r J = VL()  2Lg is
not empty and L(I;J) = ? otherwise; if in some period t00  t reporting or deviation occurs,
or all the cartels are detected, play S?;t00+1.
Let us now dene the strategies under a leniency policy with Amnesty Plus. For any subset
of markets I  M, we recursively dene the strategy sAP
I over one period and the strategies
SAP
I;t over the subgame starting from period t and note V AP
I () as each rm's expected payo
discounted to period t when both rms play SAP
I;t . For any subset I such that jIj  1, we
dene sAP
I and SAP





I : collude in the subset I, neither deviate from the collusive agreements nor report; if
detection of a subset of markets J ( I occurs but neither deviation nor reporting, then report
all the remaining cartels under Amnesty Plus if the set RAP(I;J) = fL  I r J = V AP
L () 
19In this extension, we allow for substitutability and complementarity between markets, and thus, K need
not be equal to the sum of the prots in each of the markets in subset K. For an analysis of multimarket
collusion with demand linkages see Choi and Gerlach (2009b).
20We use jIj as a recursive variable: the denition of the collusive strategies over I 6= ? builds on the




 )g is empty; otherwise, do not report any of the remaining cartels under
Amnesty Plus.
SAP
I;t : play sAP
I in period t and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation
from the collusive agreements nor detection; if in some period t0  t detection of a subset J ( I
occurs but neither deviation nor reporting, then play SAP
L(I;J);t0+1 where LAP(I;J)  I r J is
such that V AP
LAP(I;J)()  V AP
L () for any L  I r J if the set RAP(I;J) is not empty and
LAP(I;J) = ? otherwise; if in some period t00  t reporting or deviation occurs, or all the
cartels are detected, play SAP
?;t00+1.
The following proposition gives the natural extension of the discount-setting rule we sug-
gest in Corollary 1 for m = 2 to the general case with m  2 markets.
Proposition 4 If for all K ( M and L  M n K it holds that:
RL
K  FL
then for any I  M
V AP
I ()  VI()
which rules out any anticompetitive eect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation.
Proof. See appendix C.
5.4 Partial Collusion
We have assumed that the rms collude at the monopoly price. Indeed, in our model, if
collusion is incentive compatible in both markets, the rms have no incentives to collude at
a price lower than the monopoly price because both cartel stability and expected collusive
prots increase in industry prots. Partial collusion may however be optimal if  2 [e 1;e 2[.
To see this, suppose that, if the rms collude, they can x a price pk 2 ]ck;pm
k ] where ck
is the marginal cost of production and pm
k the monopoly price. We assume that a rm's
prot function k(pk), when both rms choose pk, is continuous, quasi-concave and reaches
its maximum at pm
k < +1. We denote  pk 2 ]ck;pm
k [ the unique solution to the equation
k(pk)   qFk = 0.
Consider rst the situation for  2 [e 1;e 2[ under the EU Leniency Program. If both rms
collude and x a price p1 2 ]c1;pm
1 ] in market 1 and a price p2 2 ]c2;pm
2 ] in market 2, each
rm's discounted expected total prot is
V12(p1;p2;) =
1(p1)   qF1
1   (1   q)
+
2(p2)   qF2
1   (1   q)2
19Joint collusion at prices (p1;p2) is sustainable if and only if the participation constraint pk   pk


















1   (1   q)2  0
Optimal joint collusion at prices (p1;p2) 2 [ p1;pm
1 ]  [ p2;pm
2 ] maximizes V12(p1;p2;) subject
to the incentive compatibility constraint given by (12). For all  2 [e 1;e 2[ the expression
( 1
1 (1 q)   2) is positive because e 1 > 1
2(1 q). The left hand side (LHS) of (12) therefore
increases in p1 which implies that full collusion in market 1, i.e. p1 = pm
1 , is always optimal
when jointly colluding. This, however, need not be true for market 2 because the LHS of the
inequality in (12) decreases in p2 if  <   = 1
2(1 q)2. We distinguish three cases:
a-If    e 1, equivalently F1
m
1  1
1 q, the joint stability of the cartels increases with p2. Full
collusion in market 2 is thus optimal when jointly colluding, and Proposition 1 remains valid.





2 , the joint stability of the cartels strictly
decreases in p2 for  2 ]e 1;  [, is independent of p2 for  =  , and strictly increases in p2
for  2 ] ;e 2[. Partial collusion arises (for some values of ) in optimal joint collusion if the
condition in (12) holds for (p1;p2;) = (pm
1 ;  p2;  ) or, equivalently, if F2 
m
1  (1 q)F1
1 2q . If this
inequality does not hold, full collusion is optimal, and Proposition 1 remains valid. If it holds,
we can show that two thresholds 12;p and 12;f exist which satisfy e 1 < 12;p < 12;f < e 2 such
that the price pair (p1();p2()) corresponding to optimal collusion contains p1() = pm
1 for
all  2 ]e 1;e 2[ and p2() as a function over ]e 1;e 2[ such that: p2() = c2 for all  2 ]e 1;12;p] (no
collusion in market 2), p2() 2 ] p2;pm
2 [ strictly increasing over ]12;p;12;f[ (partial collusion
in market 2) and p2() = pm
2 for all  2 [12;f;e 2[ (full collusion in market 2). Note that
multimarket contact makes collusion easier by inducing either partial or full collusion in
market 2.
c-If    e 2, equivalently F2
m
2  1
1 q, the joint stability of the cartels strictly decreases in p2
for all  2 [e 1;e 2[. We have two dierent situations: either joint collusion is not incentive
compatible, and the rms compete in market 2, or collusion in market 2, partial at worst and
full at best, is incentive compatible together with full collusion in market 1.
Consider now the situation under the US Leniency Program. We illustrate how the pos-




1 2q such that partial collusion may arise in equilibrium. Suppose that R2 is small
enough such that cartel 1 is robust to a detection of cartel 2 over the entire interval. We can
show that two thresholds AP
12;p and AP
12;f exist which satisfy e 1  AP
12;p  AP
12;f  e 2 such that
the price pair (pAP
1 ();pAP
2 ()) corresponding to optimal collusion contains pAP
1 () = pm
1 for all
 2 ]e 1;e 2[ and pAP
2 () as a function over ]e 1;e 2[ such that: pAP
2 () = c2 for all  2 ]e 1;AP
12;p] (no
20collusion in market 2), pAP
2 () 2 ] p2;pm
2 [ strictly increasing over ]AP
12;p;AP
12;f[ (partial collusion
in market 2) and pAP
2 () = pm
2 for all  2 [AP
12;f;e 2[ (full collusion in market 2).21 Further-
more, we can establish that for all p2 2 ] p2;pm
2 ], we have V12(p1;p2;) < V AP
12 (p1;p2;;R1;R2)
if and only if R1 > F2. Using the former result, it can be shown that, if R1 > F2, Amnesty
Plus is anticompetitive in the sense that AP
12;p < 12;p, AP
12;f < 12;f and for all  2 ]e 1;e 2[
pAP
2 ()  p2(). If R1 < F2, the reverse is true, and Amnesty Plus is procompetitive.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the eect of Amnesty Plus on the rms' incentives to form cartels.
The rms repeatedly interact in two markets of dierent size and can use their multimarket
contact to sustain collusion. While US success stories suggest that Amnesty Plus weakens
cartel stability, our analysis shows that this is not correct in general.
We nd that Amnesty Plus may increase cartel deterrence provided that the procollusive
eect is avoided. The central implication of our analysis is that an antitrust authority can
easily prevent this eect by adhering to the following rule: Set the absolute size of the ne
discount granted in one market equal or below the ne the successful Amnesty Plus appli-
cant would have incurred in the other market. We argue that this rule must be explicitly
incorporated in the Amnesty Plus policy. One important reason is that, on top of pursuing
a social welfare objective, an antitrust authority cares about performance. If performance is
measured by the number of cartels dismantled, the antitrust authority may want to oer high
discounts ex post, which may come with undesirable eects on deterrence ex ante.
Appendix
A The Sequential Equilibrium
We show that (S2!1;S2!1) can never be the best collusive equilibrium if q is suciently
small. We proceed in 2 steps. In step 1, we show under which conditions (S2!1;S2!1) is an
equilibrium. In step 2, we demonstrate that, when (S2!1;S2!1) is an equilibrium, there is
always another equilibrium that Pareto dominates the latter if q is suciently small.
Step 1. The expected payo associated with (S2!1;S2!1) is
V2!1() = V2() + q

1   (1   q)
V1()
(S2!1;S2!1) is an equilibrium if and only if cartel 1 is individually stable, i.e.   e 1, and
V2!1()  22. These two conditions hold if and only if   max(e 1;e 2!1) where e 2!1 is such
that V2!1(e 2!1) = 22.
21We cannot exclude that one or even two of these intervals are empty.
21Step 2. Note rst that for   e 2, V1!2() > V2!1() if and only if V1() > V2() which
always holds because of our assumptions 1 > 2 and F2
2 > F1
1. Hence, (S1!2;S1!2) always
strictly Pareto dominates (S2!1;S2!1) for any  in this range. Consider now the interval
[max(e 1;e 2!1);e 2[. The equilibrium (S1;S1) strictly Pareto dominates (S2!1;S2!1) if and





1   (1   q)
As the right hand side (RHS) of the above inequality is decreasing in , this condition holds
for all  2 [max(e 1;e 2!1);e 2[ if and only if it holds for  = e 2, i.e.
(1   q)(2   qF2)2
(1   qF1)(2(1   2q)   qF2)
< 1
As the LHS of the above inequality is continuous in q and tends to 2
1 < 1 when q ! 0,
there exists a threshold e q > 0 such that V1() > V2!1() for all q 2 ]0; e q[ and all  2
[max(e 1;e 2!1);e 2[. Hence, if q < e q, (S1;S1) always strictly Pareto dominates (S2!1;S2!1)
for any  in this range.
B The Eect of Multimarket Contact
Multimarket contact is procollusive, i.e. e 12 < e 2, if and only if
V12(e  
2 ) > 21 + 22










1 + q   q(1   q)F2
2
(B-1)
This condition holds only if the markets are suciently dierent in terms of protability. To




F1 < F2  F1
If 2 ! 1, the above inequality implies that F2 ! F1, and the RHS of the inequality in (B-1)
converges to













1 and 1 qF1 > 0, the second
expression in the RHS of the inequality in (B-2) is strictly positive. Hence, the condition in (B-
1) is not satised, and multimarket contact cannot help to stabilize an individually unstable
cartel if markets 1 and 2 are too close in terms of protability. In this case, multimarket contact
is neutral, i.e. e 12 = e 2. However, if market 1 is suciently more protable than market 2,
in the sense that the condition in (B-1) holds, then multimarket contact is procollusive, i.e.
e 12 < e 2:
This nding contrasts with the irrelevance result in Bernheim and Whinston (1990). In
our model, the latter takes the form of the special case q = 0 in which multimarket contact
cannot aect the rms' ability to collude as the individual stability constraints are identical
for both markets. If the presence of an antitrust authority creates an asymmetry between the
markets in terms of collusion sustainability, due to e.g. heterogenous detection probabilities
or ne-prot ratios, then multimarket contact may ease collusion.
C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We proceed in three steps. In step 1, we determine the range of
discount factors for which (S12;S12) is an equilibrium. In step 2, we show that the sequential
collusion equilibrium can never be the best collusive equilibrium of the game. In step 3, we
conclude.
Step 1. The value of joint collusion V12() is given by:
V12() =
8
> > > <












1 (1 q) if e 2  
(C-1)
If  < e 1, (S12;S12) is not an equilibrium because V12()  V1() + V2() < 21 + 22.
If   e 2, (S12;S12) is an equilibrium because V12() = V1() + V2()  21 + 22. Consider
now  2 [e 1;e 2[. Note rst that
V12(e 1) = 21 +
2   qF2
1   e 1(1   q)2 < 21 + V2(e 1) < 21 + 22
It follows from the continuity and strict monotonicity of V12() that V12() < 21 + 22 for
any  2 ]e 1;e 2[ if V12(e  
2 )  21 + 21. However, if V12(e  
2 ) > 21 + 21 then a threshold
exists in the interval ]e 1;e 2[ such that V12()  21 + 22 for the discount factor values
above this threshold and V12() < 21 + 22 for values below. Thus, a (unique) threshold
e 12 2]e 1;e 2] always exists such that (S12;S12) is an equilibrium for   e 12 and (S12;S12) is
not an equilibrium for  < e 12: If V12(e  
2 ) > 21 + 21 then e 12 < e 2: Otherwise e 12 = e 2:
23Step 2. We show that whenever (S1!2;S1!2) is an equilibrium, it is strictly dominated
by the equilibrium (S12;S12) and thus cannot be the best collusive equilibrium. We know
that (S1!2;S1!2) is an equilibrium if and only if   e 2. However, for   e 2, the strategy
pair (S12;S12) constitutes an equilibrium as well and yields a collusive payo of V12() =
V1() + V2() (Step 1). Since V1() + V2() > V1() + q 
1 (1 q)V2(), (S1!2;S1!2) can
never be the best collusive equilibrium. Notice that we exclude  = 1 because (S12;S12) and
(S1!2;S1!2) yield the same payo in that case, and both are best collusive equilibria.
Step 3. We conclude that:
-If  < e 1, neither (S1;S1) nor (S1!2;S1!2) nor (S12;S12) is an equilibrium.
-If e 1   < e 12, the only collusive equilibrium is (S1;S1):
-If   e 12 then (S12;S12) is an equilibrium and yields a higher payo than (S1;S1) and
(S1!2;S1!2), whenever it is an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider rst  < b 1(R2) where cartel 1 is not robust to a detection




1   (1   q)2 +
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2 +
q(1   q)(R1 + R2   F1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)
Since Rk  Fk, we know from (C-1) in Proof of Proposition 1 that V AP
12 (;R1;R2)  V12().
Amnesty Plus cannot increase the value of joint collusion.




1    (1   q)
+
2   qF2





q (1   q)(R1   F2)
2

1    (1   q)
2

Amnesty Plus therefore increases the value of jointly colluding, i.e. V AP
12 (;R1;R2) > V12(),
if and only if R1 > F2
Proof of Proposition 2. The value of joint collusion V AP
12 (;R1;R2) is strictly increasing
and right-continuous in  over [e 1;e 12[. Therefore, a necessary and sucient condition for
(SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ) to be the best collusive equilibrium over a non-empty sub-interval of [e 1;e 12[ is
that V AP
12 (e  
12;R1;R2) > 21 + 22. The Proof of Lemma 1 shows that if e 12  b 1(R2) then
V AP
12 (e  
12;R1;R2) < V12(e  
12)  V12(e 12) = 21 + 22. However, if b 1(R2) < e 12 (equivalent to
the condition in (9)) then V AP
12 (e  
12;R1;R2) = V12(e  
12)+
q(1 q)(R1 F2)
2(1 e 12(1 q)2) > 21+22 if and only
if the condition in (10) holds.
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume rst that R2 >  R2, which implies that b 1(R2) >
e 12. For  2 [e 12;b 1(R2)[ cartel 1 is not robust and the Proof of Lemma 1 shows that
V AP
12 (e 12;R1;R2) < V12(e 12) = 21 + 22. Hence, for any  2 [e 12;b 1(R2)[ suciently close
24to e 12, it must hold that V AP
12 (;R1;R2) < 21 + 22 which implies that (S12;S12) is not an
equilibrium and that (S1;S1) is then the best collusive equilibrium.
Assume now that R2   R2, which implies that b 1(R2)  e 12. For any  2 [e 12;e 2[, cartel




1   (1   q)
+
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2 +
q(1   q)(R1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)
= V1() +
2(2   qF2) + q(1   q)(R1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)
(S1;S1) is the best collusive equilibrium for a given  if and only if either
V AP
12 (;R1;R2) < 21 + 22 (C-2)
or
V AP
12 (;R1;R2) < V1() (C-3)
As we initially assumed that q  2




2(1 (1 q)2) is strictly positive, and because V1() is increasing in ,
V AP
12 (;R1;R2) is also increasing in  over [e 12;e 2[. Hence, (S1;S1) is the best collusive
equilibrium for a non-empty range of values of  in [e 12;e 2[ if and only if at least one of
the conditions (C-2) and (C-3) holds for  = e 12, i.e.
V AP








q(1   q)(R1   F2)







Since V1(e 12) < V12(e 12) = 21+22 the latter condition can be rewritten as
q(1 q)(R1 F2)
2(1 (1 q)2) < 0
which is the same as R1 < F2
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that ne discounts under Amnesty Plus are such that
RL
K  FL for all K   M and L  M n K.For every i 2 f2;3;:::;mg; denote Mi = fI 
M such that jIj  ig. Let us prove by recursive induction on i that, for any i 2 f2;3;:::;mg,
V AP
I ()  VI() for all I 2 Mi.
For i = 2; the result is readily derived from our main analysis. Consider any i  3 and
assume that V AP
I ()  VI() for all I 2 Mi 1: To complete the proof, we need to show that
the latter inequality also holds for any I 2 Mi. To do so, it is sucient to establish that the
inequality is true for any subset I of i markets, i.e. such that jIj = i. Consider such a subset.
25VI () is recursively dened as:
VI () = I + (1   q)




qjJj (1   q)
i jJj [ FJ + Y (I;J)]   qiFI
where Y (I;J) = 0 if R(I;J) = ? and Y (I;J) = VL(I;J)() otherwise, which yields:
VI () =
1









qjJj (1   q)






I () is recursively dened as:
V AP






qjJj (1   q)
i jJj 
 FJ + Y AP (I;J)

  qiFI




















qjJj (1   q)
i jJj 







Let us show that for any non-empty set J   I, it holds that Y AP(I;J)  Y (I;J) which is a
sucient condition for the inequality V AP
I ()  VI() to hold.
Assume rst that J is such that R(I;J) = ?, i.e. for any L  I r J, it holds that
VL() < 2L. Since any L  I r J belongs to Mi 1; we have: V AP




 ). Therefore, RAP(I;J) = ?. Thus, in this case, we get Y (I;J) = Y AP(I;J) =
0.






J )  0  VL(I;J)() = Y (I;J). If RAP(I;J) 6= ? then by denition of L(I;J), we have
VLAP(I;J)()  VL(I;J)() and since LAP(I;J) belongs to Mi 1, we also have V AP
LAP(I;J)() 
VLAP(I;J)(). Combining the latter two inequalities we obtain V AP
LAP(I;J)()  VL(I;J)(), which
implies that Y AP(I;J)  Y (I;J).
We can conclude that Y AP(I;J)  Y (I;J) holds for any non-empty set J   I; which
implies that V AP
I ()  VI().
26D The Procompetitive Eect of Amnesty Plus if  2 [e 2;1[
Amnesty Plus defers the formation of cartel 2, i.e. it makes (S1!2;S1!2) the best collusive
equilibrium, for at least some values of  in [e 2;1[ if and only if it lowers the value of jointly
colluding such that either joint collusion is no more incentive compatible or is Pareto dom-
inated by sequential collusion. First, we show for which specic values of R1 and R2, the
strategy pair (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ) cannot be an equilibrium for at least some values in the interval,
and, second, we provide conditions under which (S1!2;S1!2) Pareto dominates (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ).
The present discounted expected payo V AP
12 (;R1;R2), each rm gets when they both
play the strategy SAP
12 , is right-continuous and strictly increasing in  over the interval [e 2;1[.
Hence, (SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ) is not an equilibrium for a non-empty range of values of  in [e 2;1[ if and
only if
V AP
12 (e 2;R1;R2) < 21 + 22 (D-4)
The value V AP
12 (e 2;R1;R2) depends on the equilibrium payo in the reporting subgame of
stage 4. We therefore examine the condition in (D-4) for each of the four possible scenarios
that arise from the comparison of the individual stability threshold e 2 and the robustness
thresholds:
a-If e 2  b 1(R2) and e 2  b 2(R1), both cartels are individually stable and robust for  = e 2
and the value of joint collusion is equal to
V AP
12 (e 2;R1;R2) =
1   qF1
1   e 2(1   q)
+
2   qF2
1   e 2(1   q)
> 21 + 22
It is straightforward that in this case the condition in (D-4) cannot hold. The ne reductions
R1 and R2 are both too small to trigger reporting in the reporting subgame. Amnesty Plus
has no eect and V AP
12 (e 2;R1;R2) = V12(e 2).
b-If e 2  b 1(R2) and e 2 < b 2(R1), cartel 1 is individually stable and robust whereas cartel 2
is stable but not robust for  = e 2. The value of joint collusion is equal to
V AP
12 (e 2;R1;R2) =
1   qF1
1   e 2(1   q)
+
2   qF2
1   e 2(1   q)2 +
q(1   q)(R1   F2)
2

1   e 2(1   q)2

We can thus rewrite condition (D-4) as
R1 < F2 +
2





21 + 22   V1(e 2)  
2   qF2
1   e 2(1   q)2
!
which suggests that, if Amnesty Plus can induce the reporting of cartel 2 in the reporting
27subgame, the ne reduction in market 1 must be suciently low. Otherwise, the decrease of
the expected ne would compensate the rms for the enhanced desistance, and the procom-
petitive eect cannot occur.
c-If e 2 < b 1(R2) and e 2  b 2(R1), cartel 2 is individually stable and robust whereas cartel 1
is individually stable but not robust for  = e 2. The value of joint collusion is equal to
V AP
12 (e 2;R1;R2) =
1   qF1
1   e 2(1   q)2 +
2   qF2
1   e 2(1   q)
+
q(1   q)(R2   F1)
2

1   e 2(1   q)2

Condition (D-4) becomes
R2 < F1 +
2







1   e 2(1   q)2
!
A similar argument as above applies, and the procompetitive eect cannot occur.
d-If e 2 < b 1(R2) and e 2 < b 2(R1), both cartels are stable but not robust for  = e 2. The value
of joint collusion is
V AP
12 (e 2;R1;R2) =
1   qF1
1   e 2(1   q)2 +
2   qF2
1   e 2(1   q)2 +
q(1   q)(R1 + R2   F1   F2)
2

1   e 2(1   q)2

We rewrite the condition in (D-4) as




4e 2(1   q)(1 + 2)
q
In this case, Amnesty Plus triggers the reporting in each possible reporting subgame of stage
4. The ne reductions must be suciently low such that the expected nes do not decrease
too much.
We now provide sucient conditions under which (S1!2;S1!2) Pareto dominates
(SAP
12 ;SAP
12 ). Since V1!2(1 ) = V1(1 ) + V2(1 ) > 21 + 22 and V1!2() is continuous
and increasing on [e 2;1[, a threshold e 1!2 2 [e 2;1[ exists such that for  values in this inter-
val, we have V1!2()  21 + 22 if and only if   e 1!2. This implies that the comparison
of V AP
12 (;R1;R2) to V1!2() is mainly relevant over the interval [e 1!2;1[. In what follows,
we therefore concentrate on suciently high values of .
Consider the case where b 1(R2) > 1. Cartel 1 is then not robust for any value of  in this




1   (1   q)2 +
2   qF2
1   (1   q)2 +
q(1   q)(R1 + R2   F1   F2)
2(1   (1   q)2)








q(1   q)(R2   F1)
2(1   (1   q)2)
In both cases it is true that V AP
12 (1 ;R1;R2) < V1(1 ) + V2(1 ) = V1!2(1 ) which implies
that V AP
12 (;R1;R2) < V1!2() for a non-empty range of values of  suciently close to 1.
Hence, for this range of values, Amnesty Plus defers the formation of cartel 2.
Consider now the case where b 1(R2)  1. Amnesty Plus defers the formation of cartel 2
for values of  suciently close to 1 if
2   qF2
q










The LHS ensures that cartel 2 is not robust, i.e. b 2(R1) > 1, and the RHS implies that
V AP
12 (1 ;R1;R2) < V1(1 ) + V2(1 ) = V1!2(1 ) given that b 1(R2)  1 and b 2(R1) > 1.
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